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Aesthetic Freedom and Democratic Ethical Life:  
A Hegelian Account of the Relationship between Aesthetics and Democratic Politics 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents a novel Hegelian view of the relationship between aesthetics and 
democratic politics. My account avoids the drawbacks associated with approaches that (like 
Rancière’s) reconceive all of the political in aesthetic terms or (like Rockhill’s) reduce the 
aesthetic to art. Instead, I maintain that the aesthetic is best understood as a distinct 
recognition relationship of individual freedom. My argument proceeds by highlighting 
shortcomings of Honneth’s account of democratic Sittlichkeit and then addressing these 
impasses by integrating aesthetic freedom into the picture. The first two steps of my 
argument concern the fact that the form of life outlined by Honneth aspires to be a form of 
free life, yet his account of democratic Sittlichkeit gives rise to two dimensions of unfreedom. 
The first problem of unfreedom pertains to the scope of freedom. The relationships of 
freedom incorporated into Honneth’s account fail to turn given social roles into the subject 
matter of a sufficiently unrestricted practice of freedom. The second problem of freedom 
concerns conformism. In a final step, I complete my argument that Honneth’s account is 
unsatisfactory and incomplete by showing that aesthetic freedom is socially valid and thus 
ought to form part of our accounts of democratic ethical life. 
 
Introduction 
In this paper, I outline and defend a distinct Hegelian position in the current debate about the 
relationship between aesthetics and (democratic) politics.
1
 In doing so, I also argue that we 
have to revise our accounts of democratic Sittlichkeit, of democratic ethical life. The 
approach I am defending is Hegelian in two senses (but it is neither Hegel’s own nor that of 
any of his contemporary followers): First, I conceive of democratic societies as realising a 
distinct form of ethical life for which equal freedom provides the overarching normative 
horizon. Following authors like Honneth, I understand democratic societies as being 
composed of different relations of recognition or freedom which, taken together, ensure equal 
freedom for all. Second, I argue that the aesthetic is best understood as a variant of individual 
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freedom that complements other relations of freedom and forms part and parcel of democratic 
ethical life. In a nutshell, such aesthetic freedom consists in an engagement with the world 
that is at once passive-receptive, disinterested, and active-creative (see I.3 below). 
My Hegelian approach is particularly suited to explain the distinct contribution 
aesthetic freedom makes to democratic life and to account for why aesthetic freedom has a 
legitimate place in it. My position avoids shortcomings that are characteristic of two common 
alternative ways to conceptualise the relationship between aesthetics and (democratic) 
politics. Rancière’s strategy to reconceive the political in its entirety as an aesthetic 
phenomenon can serve as an illustration of the first alternative model (e.g. Rancière, 2004, 
pp. 7-15). For him, there can be no ‘“aestheticization” of politics … because politics is 
aesthetic in principle’ (Rancière, 1999, p. 58). He conceives of the political, which is made 
up of the antagonistic relationship between the police and politics, in terms of a distribution 
of the sensible (Panagia, 2010). Police is Rancière’s name for a socio-political order that is 
understood as a ‘configuration of the perceptible’ (Rancière, 1999, p. 29), since it defines the 
ways of being, seeing, acting, speaking, etc. that form part of this order. Politics, on the other 
hand, denotes an ‘activity antagonistic to policing’ (ibid.) that aims to re-configure the police. 
Whatever the benefits of Rancière’s conceptualisation of the political in terms of a 
distribution of the sensible might be, the drawback of this strategy is that it turns all of social 
life into an aesthetic phenomenon. As a result, it becomes impossible to even ask how the 
aesthetic interacts with other domains of socio-political life, such as the moral, legal, 
political, or economic domain. This is shortcoming is significant, for one can only account 
for the distinct contribution the aesthetic makes to democratic life, if one is able to describe 
how the aesthetic intervenes in the various other dimensions of social life. However, this 
presupposes that one has the conceptual resources to distinguish the aesthetic dimension from 
other dimensions of social life. My Hegelian approach, which conceives of the aesthetic as 
one among a number of distinct relations of freedom that jointly make up democratic life, 
achieves this.  
This brings me to the shortcoming of another common way to approach the 
relationship between aesthetics and politics, namely, to conflate the aesthetic with art or the 
artistic.
2
 Of course, there is nothing wrong with exploring the relationship between art and 
politics, especially since in modern times art in the singular emerged as a distinct domain that 
is separated from all others (e.g. Rockhill 2014, pp. 26-7; Shiner, 2001). The questions of 
whether and how art can be of political relevance under these circumstances is therefore 
pertinent. My reason for rejecting this framing is that it is too narrow for the purpose of 
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shedding light on the role and place of aesthetics in democratic life. I do think that art is 
underpinned by what I call exercises of aesthetic freedom, but not all exercises of aesthetic 
freedom are artistic. Equating the aesthetic with art, or artistic practices, therefore gives rise 
to the following problem that my account avoids: non-artistic exercises of aesthetic freedom 
fall outside the scope of such approaches. As a result, they are unable to account for, or 
reflect on, the contributions non-artistic exercises of aesthetic freedom make to democratic 
ethical life. By contrast, my understanding of the aesthetic makes room for taking into 
consideration both artistic and non-artistic exercises of aesthetic freedom.  
In what follows, I account for the place and role of aesthetic freedom in democratic 
ethical life, using Axel Honneth’s Freedom’s Right (2014) as a backdrop. This monograph is 
the most advanced and systematic attempt to update the project Hegel pursued in his 
Philosophy of Right (1821) for contemporary Western liberal-democratic societies. Drawing 
on the architecture of relations of freedom identified by Hegel in his Philosophy of Right, 
Honneth provides an outline of these societies as realising a distinctly democratic form of 
Sittlichkeit.  
My argument proceeds negatively and in three steps. Each step highlights a 
shortcoming of Honneth’s account and then proceeds to show that each impasse could be 
addressed by integrating aesthetic freedom into our account of democratic ethical life. The 
first two steps of my argument identify shortcomings that concern the fact that the form of 
life outlined by Honneth aspires to be a form of free life, yet his account of democratic 
Sittlichkeit gives rise to, and lacks the resources to deal with, two dimensions of unfreedom. 
The first problem of unfreedom pertains to the scope of freedom. The relationships of 
freedom incorporated into Honneth’s account of democratic ethical life are unable to turn 
given social roles and norms themselves into the subject matter of a (sufficiently unrestricted) 
practice of freedom. As a result, we cannot understand these roles and norms as being 
expressive of our freedom. The second problem of freedom concerns conformism, or the way 
in which we inhabit our social roles. This problem arises from the fact that role-mediated 
relationships have an in-built ‘tendency for conformism’ (Honneth 2014, p. 384, n.476) that 
threatens to undermine our freedom. In order to underpin my claim that Honneth’s account of 
democratic Sittlichkeit is unsatisfactory (as an account of a form of free life) and incomplete, 
I show in the third step of my argument that aesthetic freedom is socially valid and as such 
has to be recognised as part of our accounts of democratic ethical life. Despite professing to 
track all the dimensions of the value of freedom that have ‘taken on an institutional shape’ 
(Honneth, 2014, 66), Honneth omits at least one of them: aesthetic freedom understood as a 
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variant of individual freedom. This is a problem, since the ambition to be comprehensive 
forms part and parcel of any attempt to outline an account of democratic Sittlichkeit. What 
emerges from this line of argument is that aesthetic freedom belongs to democratic ethical 
life and makes a distinct contribution to rendering it a life of freedom by providing the 
resources for addressing the two above mentioned dimensions of unfreedom. Indeed, it will 
become apparent that aesthetic freedom accounts for distinct characteristics of democratic 
life, for instance, its openness for radical self-critique and self-transformation.
3
  
I. Democratic Sittlichkeit and the Problem of Scope Unfreedom 
 
I.1 The Idea of Democratic Ethical Life  
To say that societies instantiate a distinct form of ethical life implies that they share a form of 
‘practical meaningfulness’ (Pippin, 2008, p.  6). “Sittlichkeit” means ‘the achievement and 
maintenance of such a form of intelligible life’ (ibid.). The study of ethical life thus proceeds 
by way of a reconstructive elucidation of the norms that underpin social institutions (even if 
they are inadequately realised by them).
4
 ‘Hegel’s strategy’ consists in ‘picking up on values 
and ideas already institutionalized’ (Honneth, 2014, p. 63). Ideal-theoretical approaches, by 
contrast, aim at ‘justifying principles of justice without taking account of the facticity of 
social relations, in order to then re-establish a connection – at a second (or third) stage – with 
current social conditions by gradually introducing empirical circumstances’ (ibid.). There is 
another respect in which viewing societies in terms of ethical life sets apart Hegelian from 
mainstream approaches to political philosophy. The ‘point of reference’ of Sittlichkeit are ‘all 
institutional social spheres’ (ibid.), whereas mainstream liberal approaches tend to focus on 
the political sphere more narrowly conceived.
5
 Furthermore, unlike many contemporary 
political philosophers, Hegelians are value monists. They take it to be a feature of modern 
societies that their normative horizon is formed by ‘one value’, namely ‘the ethical idea’ 
(ibid., p. 64) of freedom. As a theorist of democratic ethical life, Honneth stresses the 
egalitarian dimension of this commitment: ‘all subjects must enjoy equal support in their 
striving for individual freedom’ (ibid.; also p. 15). Against this backdrop, theorists of 
democratic Sittlichkeit maintain that all social institutions jointly making up modern 
democratic societies ‘do represent specific functional embodiments of the one universal value 
of individual freedom’ (ibid., p. 345, n.1). The differentiation of social institutions is thus 
assumed to track the differentiation of the value of freedom (ibid., p. 65). It is an upshot of 
the last point that working out an account of democratic ethical life entails a commitment to 
comprehensiveness. Accounts of democratic Sittlichkeit aim for completeness, and for them 
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to be complete they have to reconstruct all ‘socially valid’ (ibid., p. 63) dimensions of 
freedom. The task of normative reconstruction is thus to ‘gradually etch into relief those 
individual spheres of action in liberal-democratic societies in which the value of individual 
freedom has taken on an institutional shape’ (ibid., p. 66; also p. 330). Finally, theorists of 
Sittlichkeit are holists. They believe, on the one hand, that different social spheres realise 
different dimensions of freedom and, on the other, that these dimensions complement and 
depend on each other (ibid., pp. 84, 86-94, 96, 113-20, 128-9, 273). In their view, the ‘social 
system of democratic ethical life … represents a complicated web of reciprocal dependencies, 
where the realization of freedom in one sphere of action depends on the realization of the 
principles of freedom underlying the other spheres’ (ibid., p. 330). For instance, ‘democratic 
will-formation presupposes’ (ibid.) that freedom is already (sufficiently) realised in the 
personal and economic sphere. For unless individuals have already developed a sense of self-
confidence, self-worth and independence, their ability to appear in the public sphere and to 
contribute to democratic will-formation will be stinted (ibid., p. 332).  
 Having introduced these formal features of democratic ethical life, I can now turn to 
its substance: different institutionalised relations of freedom. For Hegelians, all relations of 
freedom are also relations of recognition. Freedom always has a social dimension and a 
normative dimension, since relationships of recognition are mediated by social norms and 
roles that are constitutive of social practices. Through recognition, individuals acquire a 
social ‘status that entitles’ them to ‘consideration shown them by other subjects’ (ibid., p. 
124). This status licences them to engage in specific kinds of acts. On the basis of his 
conceptual and sociological reconstruction, Honenth distinguishes between two kinds of 
relationships of recognition or freedom: relations of social freedom and individual freedom.
6
 
Each kind encompasses different variants of freedom. In the case of social freedom, we are 
concerned with the social status of being a (full-fledged) participant in a substantive context 
of action in which a dimension of freedom is realised. Social freedom is therefore freedom in 
the modality of ‘reality’ (ibid.). With regards to modern societies, Hegelians distinguish 
between three variants of social freedom: personal, economic and political freedom. In these 
three social spheres, relations between individuals are mediated by norms of recognition in 
such a way that their actions complement each other. In personal relationships (of love and 
friendship), we enable one another to ‘freely articulate’ and satisfy our ‘actual [emotional] 
needs and interests’ (Honneth 2016: 89). In productive social cooperation, we relate to each 
other in such a way that we can satisfy our material needs and desire to be esteemed for our 
contributions to shared goals. Finally, in the sphere of democratic will-formation, we relate to 
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each other in a way that we can understand individual expressions of opinion as contributions 
to a common project of the ‘intersubjective exploration of a common will’ (ibid., p. 36). In 
short, as a result of processes of functional differentiation, there are different relations of 
social freedom that are concerned with different dimensions of freedom. What they have in 
common is that they all denote substantive contexts of action that structure the relations 
between individuals such that they act for one another (see Honneth, 2014, pp. 127-128).
7
 
Social freedom is freedom as realised in the social.   
 Relations of individual freedom are of a different kind as they denote a socially 
granted freedom from the social. The point of the two variants of individual freedom that 
form part of Hegelian accounts of ethical life – i.e. legal and moral freedom – is to ensure 
that we can regard our participation in relations of social freedom itself as free. In Honneth’s 
own words: ‘the prerequisite for freely participating in these spheres [of social freedom] is an 
entirely different category of freedom’, namely individual freedom (ibid., p. 71; my 
emphasis). Unlike relations of social freedom, relations of individual freedom do ‘not 
generate any new substantial contexts of action’ (ibid., p. 123) in which dimensions of 
freedom are realised. They denote a socially granted possibility to withdraw from, or 
scrutinise, extant relations of social freedom. Relations of individual freedom are thus about 
suspending one’s ordinary participation in relations of social freedom. Since freedom is only 
realised in relations of social freedom, individual freedom is freedom in the modality of 
‘possibility’ (Honneth, 2016, p. 69; also p. 124), not reality.
8
 Legal freedom is underpinned 
by a ‘negative conception of freedom’ (Honneth 2014: 65). Being recognised as a subject of 
rights enables individuals to withdraw, at least temporarily, from their relationships of social 
freedom and to ‘act on their own unreflected preferences’ (ibid.) within the space opened up 
by their rights, that is, without having to justify to others why they act in the way they do. In 
terms of social ontology, legal freedom is strongly institutionalised, since rights are 
enforceable (ibid., p. 96).  Moral freedom, on the other hand, is a ‘reflexive’ (ibid., pp. 29-41; 
65) variant of individual freedom. Being recognised as a moral subject licenses an individual 
to interrupt her or his ordinary involvement in relations of freedom in order to scrutinise 
whether ‘social demands’ originating from given interpretations of social roles and norms are 
‘unreasonable’ (ibid., p. 98) and to demand, if applicable, that less biased interpretations of 
these roles and norms are adopted. Compared to legal freedom, moral freedom is only weakly 
institutionalised, for we are dealing with a culturally granted opportunity that is not backed 
by state power (ibid., p. 96).  
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I.2 On the Limited Scope of Legal and Moral Freedom 
With these clarifications in place, I can substantiate my first claim. There is a problem with 
the scope of freedom in Honneth’s account of democratic Sittlichkeit that aspires to outline a 
life of freedom. This account falls short of its aim since legal and moral freedom (on their 
own) do not turn existing social roles and norms into the subject matter of a practice of 
freedom (in a sufficiently unrestricted fashion). As a consequence, individuals cannot regard 
given roles and norms – through which they realise their freedom – as being expressive of 
their freedom. Instead, they appear – and are presented by Honneth – as social or 
‘institutional facts’ that individuals are ‘constantly compelled to antecedently recognize’ 
(Honneth 2014, p. 111). If this diagnosis is correct, then the account of democratic Sittlichkeit 
outlined by Honneth is shown to be inadequate as an account of a free form of life, for it 
lacks the resources to adequately deal with the problem of scope unfreedom. Against this 
backdrop, I argue that by integrating another variant of individual freedom, namely aesthetic 
freedom, into the architecture of relations of freedom we can overcome this impasse, since 
aesthetic freedom brings extant roles and norms themselves into the remit of a practice of 
freedom.   
 Let me now explain why the two variants of individual freedom that form part of 
Honneth’s picture are unsuited to adequately deal with the problem of scope unfreedom. I 
consider the case of legal freedom first. Like Honneth, I think that being recognised as a 
subject of rights contributes to rendering one’s participation in relations of social freedom 
free, since it enables individuals to withdraw themselves, at least temporarily, from 
relationships of social freedom. Civil rights, for example, empower individuals to end 
personal relationships like marriages or friendships. It is for this reason that we can regard 
our continued presence in such relations as freely chosen. Similarly, I can only regard the 
distinct way in which I contribute to social cooperation as being expressive of my freedom, if 
I have the right to quit my job and change my career.
9
 What matters for the purposes of my 
argument are, however, the limits of subjective rights in relation to addressing the first 
dimension of unfreedom. Subjective rights license individuals to withdraw from relationships 
of social freedom, but they do not denote (at least not on their own) a variant of individual 
freedom that empowers individuals to transform the very social roles and norms that 
underpin extant relations of freedom. Despite providing other benefits of freedom, legal 
freedom is thus unable to address the problem of scope unfreedom plaguing Honneth’s 
Hegelian account of democratic Sittlichkeit.  
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 The only other variant of individual freedom available to deal with this problem (in 
Honneth’s existing account) is moral freedom. Being recognized as a moral subject implies 
that one is ‘always free … regardless of social position … to question’ (Honneth, 2014, p. 98) 
demands associated with social roles and norms. In the case of moral freedom, the point of 
the ‘interruption’ of one’s ordinary participation in relations of freedom is to ‘gain reflexive 
distance’ (ibid., p. 112). As modern subjects, we regard ourselves as ‘free’ only ‘to the extent 
that we obey universalizable norms’ (ibid., p. 104). By implication, our participation in 
relations of social freedom is only free, if our social status as moral subject licenses us to 
engage in this particular ‘reflexive’ (ibid., p. 65) activity: to ‘test’ the ‘social 
universalizability’ (ibid., p. 98) of extant social norms and roles, to ‘reject unreasonable 
social demands’ (ibid.; also pp. 97, 103), and to propose ‘new’, more reasonable ‘systems of 
norms’ (ibid., p. 104). Moral freedom thus has a passive-receptive and an active-creative 
dimension. The former dimension consists in being attentive to those aspects of roles and 
norms that cannot be justified to all affected by them on the basis of ‘unversalizable reasons’ 
(ibid., p. 116). The latter dimension refers to the activity of generating, and demanding the 
adoption of, less biased interpretations of social roles and norms. Moral freedom is thus 
imbued ‘with a transformative power that legal freedom does not have’ (ibid., p. 112). As a 
result, moral freedom constitutes part of the answer to the problem of scope unfreedom. 
However, it remains the case that moral freedom’s transformative potential cannot on its own 
provide a fully satisfactory answer to this problem. To see why that is, we have to 
distinguish, as Hegelians tend to do, between pathological and benign exercises of moral 
freedom.  
 In its pathological form, moral freedom denotes the self-undermining attempt to 
realise the creative-transformative dimension of moral freedom, while abandoning its 
receptive dimension. It is characteristic for pathological exercises of moral freedom that those 
engaging in them completely abstract from extant social roles and ‘social rules that determine 
the nature of the relation between the subjects in specific spheres of society’ (ibid., p. 111). 
As a result, one is left with nothing but the form of universality itself and the ‘abstract 
perspective of universal humanity’ (ibid., p. 115). This creates two impasses: first, one is 
deprived of the substance with which alternative social roles and norms could be construed; 
second, it is hard to see how one can reconnect such pathological exercises with the fabric of 
our social world.
10
 Honneth illustrates this with ‘the example of a university professor who 
notices a relatively harmless act of plagiarism on the part of a close colleague and considers 
the appropriate action to take’ (ibid., p. 110). In such a situation, one cannot identify the right 
EJP-17-298.R1 
 
 9
course of action if one completely abstracts from the ‘role in which the subject is faced with a 
moral conflict’ (ibid., p. 111) and the point of the social practice at hand. In sum, in its 
pathological form, moral freedom undermines its transformative potential, as it abstracts 
completely from extant roles and norms. By implication, it fails to address the problem of 
scope unfreedom. 
 The benign version of moral freedom avoids these impasses by acknowledging that its 
‘ perspective … is tied to the role in which the subject is faced with the moral conflict’ 
(Honneth 2014: 111; my emphasis). Benign moral freedom treats ‘the constitutive norms’ 
and roles ‘of our form of society that underpin extant spheres of freedom as ‘institutional 
facts’ that we are ‘constantly compelled to antecedently recognize’ (ibid.; my emphasis). 
However, this means that the receptivity of moral freedom is restricted. In benign exercises 
of moral freedom we take our commitment to these roles and norms for granted and only pay 
attention to how they do, or could, affect individuals. By implication, moral freedom’s 
creative dimension is also restricted. All it aims to do is generate less biased interpretations of 
given roles and norms (ibid., pp. 112-116). These receptive and creative restrictions have 
implications for moral freedom’s capacity to provide a satisfactory answer to the problem of 
scope unfreedom. Benign moral freedom’s transformative reach and ambition are limited, 
since it ‘accepts’ extant roles and norms from the outset ‘as institutional facts’ and thus as 
‘restrictions on moral self-legislation’ (ibid., p. 112; also pp. 113-117). It merely aims to 
‘exercise influence on the … interpretation’ (ibid., p. 113; my emphasis) of extant social 
roles and norms, but does at no point even consider replacing or radically transforming them 
in ways that go beyond rendering them less biased. A paradigmatic example of an exercise of 
moral freedom is thus generating a notion of marriage that does not, unlike the traditional 
notion, discriminate against non-heterosexual couples. For the point of this intervention of 
moral freedom is to test whether the extant interpretation of marriage can be justified to ‘all 
those potentially affected’ (ibid., p. 109) by it. Due to benign moral freedom’s limited 
transformative ambition, it cannot on its own provide a fully satisfactory answer to the 
problem of scope unfreedom. For such an answer would require a more unrestricted variant 
of individual freedom capable of turning roles and norms themselves into objects of practices 
of freedom. As long as extant social roles, norms, and institutions like marriage are treated as 
‘institutional facts’ (ibid., p. 111), as is the case with moral freedom, they cannot be regarded 
as being fully within the remit of our freedom.  
This result is not substantially altered by the fact that the transformative potential of 
benign moral freedom arguably reaches a bit farther than I just presented the case: it can 
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generate less biased interpretations of extant social roles and norms not just on an atomistic 
basis, but by looking at the social whole as a whole. For exercises of moral freedom can also 
be about adjudicating conflicts between different roles and norms. In such cases, moral 
freedom’s task consists in giving all extant social roles and norms due consideration and to 
re-interpret them in such a way that their negative impact on each other is minimised as well 
as justly distributed among them.
11
 Even if we acknowledge this additional transformative 
dimension, exercises of moral freedom still do not amount to a fully convincing answer to the 
problem of scope unfreedom, for it remains the case that they are about re-interpreting given 
social roles and norms (by adopting either an atomistic or a holistic perspective) against a 
backdrop of an antecedent commitment to them (and merely aim to generate less biased 
interpretations of them, or deal with conflicts between them in an impartial fashion). 
However, a fully adequate response to the problem of scope unfreedom requires a variant of 
freedom capable of turning given roles and norms themselves into the subject matter of an 
unrestricted practice of freedom. The upshot of my point is that a society in which nothing is 
left to do for benign moral freedom (since all roles and norms are impartially interpreted and 
all conflicts between them are dealt with in an impartial fashion) can be nonetheless one that 
is marred by the unfreedom.
12
 
It has been established that legal freedom, on its own, has no bearing on the problem 
of scope unfreedom, and moral freedom by itself cannot adequately deal with this problem 
either. There are only two options available to Hegelians to resist the conclusion that a 
Honneth-style picture of democratic Sittlichkeit is unsatisfactory as a life of freedom. They 
could either look for additional variants of individual freedom or deny that there is a 
dimension of unfreedom that is left unaddressed by benign moral freedom.  
I argue that the way forward is to take the former route and integrate aesthetic 
freedom into our accounts of democratic ethical life, for the latter is not a promising. In order 
to deny the existence of scope unfreedom, Hegelians would have to defend a very demanding 
philosophy of history that encompasses an “end of history” thesis. For their purposes, it is not 
enough to argue that equal freedom provides the ultimate normative horizon and that freedom 
is realised in relations of social freedom. I am happy to grant both assumptions (see Honneth, 
2015, p. 209). Additionally, they would have to rule out, as a matter of principle, the 
possibility that an alternative framing of relations of social freedom could result in a more 
comprehensive realisation of equal freedom for all than one achievable within the currently 
existing framework with its distinct understanding of personal, economic and political 
relations. Honneth needs an ‘“end of history”’ thesis that is strong enough ‘to rule out’ ex 
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ante ‘the possibility’ that any gains in terms of the realisation of freedom can be achieved by 
transforming ‘the normative structure’ of ‘modern society’ (ibid.; also p. 210) in a fashion 
that goes beyond re-interpreting extant social roles and norms. Given human finitude and the 
finitude of our historical experience, on the one hand, and the recognised right of subjectivity 
to question and explore alternatives to historically inherited determinations of relations of 
freedom, on the other (e.g. Rebentisch, 2016, pp.  94-99), I simply cannot see how such a 
justification could look like. 
 In fact, in The Idea of Socialism (2016) Honneth himself seems to acknowledge that 
changes in ‘the normative structure’ of a ‘modern’ democratic ‘society’ (Honneth, 2015, p. 
209; also p. 210) could reap benefits in terms of freedom. For in this book, he tells the story 
of how a range of concrete, negative, historical experiences with the normative structure of, 
and life in, post-revolutionary democratic societies led the socialists to innovate and push for 
a radical transformation of this very structure. Honneth presents this socialist project as a 
progressive contribution to democratic life, despite the fact that it cannot be understood as 
emerging from an exercise of legal or moral freedom, as it aims for more than a re-
interpretation of the social norm that was already underpinning the newly established 
capitalist market sphere. According to Honneth, the French Revolution overcame the estate-
based order and put in place a novel normative horizon. This horizon encompassed the ideals 
of ‘freedom, equality and fraternity’ (Honneth, 2016, p. 6), which were reflected in key post-
revolutionary social institutions like the capitalist market. Honneth argues that the socialists 
‘discovered an internal contradiction in the principles of the French Revolution’, for the 
‘merely legal or individualist understanding of freedom’ underlying the capitalist market was 
‘far too narrow for it to be reconcilable with the principle of fraternity’ (ibid., p. 11; also p. 
51). Against this backdrop, the socialists came up with an ‘original, groundbreaking idea’, 
namely, the idea of social freedom that ‘boldly’ unifies ‘the three partially conflicting 
principles’ of equality, liberty and fraternity ‘by interpreting individual freedom as a kind of 
freedom in which each person complements the other’, thus ‘completely resolving this 
freedom with the demands of equality and fraternity’ (ibid., p. 25).
13
 The socialist critique is 
thus not about generating a less biased interpretation of the negative conception of freedom 
underlying the economic sphere, or dealing with the conflicts between negative freedom and 
the values of equality and fraternity in an impartial fashion, but about replacing the idea of 
negative freedom with a different notion of freedom. This radical transformation cannot be 
understood as an exercise of (benign) moral freedom, for the notion of social freedom to 
which it gives rise is not a less biased interpretation of the notion of legal freedom, but an 
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‘alternative model’ (Honneth 2016: 20; also 24) of freedom.
14
 Honneth endorses the radically 
transformative socialist project emerging from the concrete negative experiences with the 
normative structure of post-revolutionary society, despite the fact that it aims ‘to replace 
individual freedom with social freedom’ in the economic sphere ‘in order to fulfill all the 
necessary prerequisites for relations of solidarity among members of society’ (ibid., p. 54; my 
emphasis). Honneth himself thus provides us with an example of a progressive project that 
aims at transforming the normative structure of democratic societies from within. Why then 
rule out ex ante that something similar could happen in the future? Why assume that the 
negative experiences our and future generations make with a given normative structure 
cannot in principle inspire alternative ways of conceiving relations of social freedom that, if 
adequately implemented, could have a positive legacy in terms of realising equal freedom? 
For instance, in the light of the ever-growing inequalities and ecological challenges (like 
climate change), it seems sensible to explore novel ways of re-integrating the political and the 
economic sphere.  
 In sum, legal and moral freedom on their own are unable to adequately address the 
problem of scope unfreedom. This means that accounts of democratic Sittlichkeit that simply 
copy the architecture of relations of freedom from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right fail to live up 
to their inherent aspiration to outline a life of freedom, since individuals cannot understand 
the roles and norms through which they realise their freedom as being themselves expressive 
of their freedom. Given this impasse, the only promising way forward for Hegelians is to 
look for another, hitherto neglected, socially valid variant of individual freedom that, together 
with moral and legal freedom, has the potential to render our participation in relations of 
social freedom fully free.  
 
I.3 Aesthetic Freedom and the Problem of Scope Unfreedom 
Given the taxonomy of relations of freedom provided above and the discussion of the limits 
of legal and moral freedom, it cannot come as a surprise that in my view aesthetic freedom is 
best characterised as a distinct variant of individual freedom. As such it is both linked with a 
practice of ‘recognition’ and a distinct mode ‘of action’ (Honneth, 2014, p. 96). Being 
recognised as an “aesthetic subject” entails a distinct social status that licenses the recognised 
individual to engage with her social world in a unique way. Like other variants of individual 
freedom (i.e. moral and legal freedom), aesthetic freedom does not denote a substantive 
context of action in which freedom is realised (ibid., p. 123), but a distinct mode of 
intervening in, or interrupting, other relations of freedom. Moral freedom empowers 
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individuals to scrutinise given interpretations of practices of social freedom. Aesthetic 
freedom licenses individuals to interrupt their ordinary involvement in these relations in order 
to contemplate and play with extant social roles and norms. In terms of social ontology, 
aesthetic freedom and moral freedom are similar since both are weakly institutionalised. Both 
are backed by an ‘opportunity, granted by the culture’ (ibid., p. 96), to engage in ‘the 
performance of’ distinct kinds of ‘acts’ that can be ‘performed by every … subject’ (ibid., p. 
65).
15
 Supporting my claim that aesthetic freedom is a distinct variant of individual freedom 
requires, among other things, to explain what is distinct about the aesthetic – as opposed to 
the moral or legal – way of relating to the world.  
It is worth recalling that the notion of the ‘aesthetic’ emerged in the second half of the 
18
th
 Century. Arguably, it found its most influential expression in Kant’s (2000) Critique of 
the Power of Judgement from 1790. What is important for my purposes is that Kant, on the 
one hand, presents a systematic argument to the effect that aesthetic-reflexive activity is 
different from moral-reflexive and theoretical-reflexive activity and, on the other hand, that it 
realises particular dimension of freedom. For Kant aesthetic-reflexive activity denotes a 
distinct way of freely relating to the world. Preventing individuals from engaging 
aesthetically with their world therefore amounts to diminishing their freedom as a distinct and 
free way of relating to the world is made unavailable to them. Aesthetic discourses like 
Kant’s thus encourage us to recognise each other as ‘aesthetic subjects’ who are licenced to 
engage in aesthetic-reflexive activities. Another feature that is relevant for my purposes is 
that theorists of the aesthetic have argued from early on that the relevance of aesthetics is not 
confined to art, but extends to the moral and socio-political dimension of human life. 
Friedrich Schiller, for instance, stated in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Mankind 
(1794) that the notion of the aesthetic has to bear ‘the whole edifice of the art of the beautiful, 
and of the still more difficult art of living’ (Schiller, 2005, p. 131) freely in community with 
others. 
With these remarks in place, I can come back to the task of explaining what is distinct 
about aesthetic relating, so that it becomes clearer what distinguishes exercises of aesthetic 
freedom from exercises of moral freedom. My aim is not to say something novel or 
surprising about aesthetic freedom, but to remind readers of familiar features that can be 
found in theorist of the aesthetic from Kant and Hegel to Adorno and Rancière. In this regard, 
it is heuristically useful to distinguish (1) a passive-receptive, (2) a disinterested and (3) an 
active-creative dimension, even though all three interact in exercises of aesthetic freedom.  
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(1) Aesthetic freedom is passive-receptive as it denotes a mode of relating to the 
world that is characterised, on the one hand, by a heightened awareness for how the world 
appears to us in all its manifold detail (Seel, 2005) and, on the other, by a willingness to let 
oneself be impressed and affected by how it appears to us (Seel, 2007). In principle, 
everything can become the object of aesthetic contemplation, for instance, ‘persons, 
institutions, … landscapes, cultures, and the dramas of politics and the arts’ (Seel, 2014, pp. 
270-271); and in aesthetic contemplation nothing that appears is filtered out as irrelevant. In 
comparison with aesthetic receptivity, moral receptivity is much more limited, for its 
attentiveness is – at least in Honneth’s account – restricted to features related to extant 
interpretations of social roles and norms that bear on their general acceptability as well as 
conflicts between roles and norms. However, it is not only the unrestricted receptivity that 
link exercises of aesthetic freedom with a particular dimension of freedom but also the 
willingness to ‘let something happen’ to us in the aesthetic-receptive ‘exploration’ (ibid., p. 
276) of how the world appear to us and how we appear to ourselves. When we engage 
aesthetically with the world, we are open to be moved and transformed by it. As a 
consequence, we can gain a distance from ourselves (or whom we took ourselves to be), for 
we can become aware of different aspects of our social world and ourselves. The unrestricted 
aesthetic receptivity is thus capable of opening up a space for the emergence of self-
difference, ‘self-encounter’ and self-reflection; a ‘space that cannot be anticipated’ (ibid.; 
also pp. 270, 271, 277, 280; also Rebentisch, 2010, p. 180).   
(2) Aesthetic receptivity is not only unrestricted but also disinterested. Kant 
elucidates this feature by way of juxtaposing our aesthetic with theoretical or practical 
engagements with the world. The two latter activities aim at ‘controlling their object 
theoretically or in practice’ (Seel, 2014, p. 271; also Guyer, 1996, p. 3), whereas aesthetic-
reflexive activity is characterised by a suspension of, or emancipation from, the practical or 
theoretical aims that normally frame our participation in practices and our engagement with 
the world. Exercises of (benign) moral freedom, for example, are not disinterested, since a 
commitment to extant social roles and norms is constitutive of them. In exercises of moral 
freedom, our aim is to control these roles and norms by way of identifying the most generally 
and reciprocally justifiable version of them and demanding their implementation. In exercises 
of aesthetic freedom, on the other hand, we suspend our commitment to social roles and 
norms and with that the interpretative-evaluative schema that typically conditions our 
awareness of and engagement with the world. In short, aesthetic receptivity is both 
unrestricted (since nothing that appears is filtered out as irrelevant) and disinterested (as 
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preconceived interpretative-evaluative schemata are suspended). Both aspects set apart 
exercises of aesthetic freedom from exercises of (benign) moral freedom and enable an 
unrestricted practice of freedom that can turn social roles and norms into their subject matter. 
 (3) This brings me to the active-creative, or meaning generating, dimension of 
aesthetic freedom that is underpinned by its unrestricted and disinterested receptivity. Kant 
referred to this dimension as the “free play” of understanding and imagination, others call it 
‘interpreting attentiveness’ (Seel, 2014, p. 275; also p. 273). Exercises of aesthetic freedom 
involve a ‘play of imagination’ that is neither autonomous nor heteronomous as it suspends 
any given ‘law and normativity’ (Menke, 2013, p. 155; my translation). The ‘play of 
imagination’ characteristic of exercises of aesthetic freedom is thus not a norm-guided 
activity, but a ‘metamorphic game of unceasing transformations and developments’ (ibid.; 
my translation). However, these creative transformations are grounded in aesthetic freedom’s 
passive-receptive dimension. Paying attention to and taking seriously how the world appears 
to oneself thus underpins and inspires this ‘metamorphic game’ whose unrestricted, or free, 
character sets it apart from the more limited creative-active dimension of (benign) moral 
freedom. Moral freedom’s creative-active dimension is limited, on the one hand, by its 
restricted receptivity, which make it pay attention only to features related to the impartiality 
of interpretations of extant social roles and norms, and, on the other, by its interested 
character, for its ambition to generate less biased interpretations of extant social roles and 
norms (or to fairly adjudicate conflicts between them) is grounded in an antecedent 
commitment to them. 
Aesthetic freedom’s features both set it apart from moral freedom and make it such 
that its exercises afford a distinct experience of freedom. In relating aesthetically to the 
world, we become aware of ‘the determinability of ourselves and the world’ (Seel, 2014, p. 
271; also p. 276) because we experience it as indeterminable. This experience of 
indeterminateness is the effect of aesthetic freedom’s unrestricted receptivity that opens up 
the ‘wealth of the real’ (ibid., p. 271) and its disinterestedness that suspends preconceived 
interpretative-evaluative schemata. We then respond to this experience of indeterminateness 
by generating meaning. In this fashion, exercises of aesthetic freedom reassure us of ‘our 
ability to determine’ (ibid.) the world, including social norms and roles. The three aspects of 
aesthetic freedom just outlined are characteristic of exercises of aesthetic freedom in general. 
However, since the focus of this paper is to identify and address dimensions of unfreedom 
left unaddressed by Honneth’s account of democratic Sittlichkeit, I only concern myself in 
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what follows with exercises of aesthetic freedom pertaining to extant roles and norms, that is, 
the ‘loadbearing structures’ (Honneth, 2014, p. 66) of social institutions. 
What is distinct about the phenomenology of aesthetic relating is that we experience it 
as our task to make sense of the world, while also experiencing this task as, in principle, 
interminable or inexhaustible. Hence the talk of fullness of meaning that is often associated 
with aesthetic experience. In aesthetic relating, the object of aesthetic contemplation is 
experienced as both inviting interpretation and eluding it; or, to be more precise, we 
experience it as ‘resistant to any single meaning’ (Gero, 2006, p. 5). It is for this reason that 
exercises of aesthetic freedom, ‘despite being sensually conditioned’, give rise ‘to an 
unlimited freedom of intellectual activity to engage in a kind of play that is not constrained 
by any conceptual determination and from which no subject is excluded’ (Bubner, 1989, p. 
38; my translation). This playful activity is unlimited because the ‘tension’ or gap ‘between 
being sensually affected’, on the one hand, and being reflexively ‘creative’ (ibid; my 
translation), on the other, can never be overcome or closed. This feature of aesthetic freedom 
leads to its excessive character, as it motivates a boundless attentiveness and an endless 
succession of interpretations; interpretations that always overshoot what appears to us. For in 
aesthetic relating we always see more than there is to see. This ‘nonemprical surplus’ is the 
effect of the creative-interpretative activity that forms part and parcel of aesthetic relating. 
Aesthetic freedom thus ‘plays along the sensual empirical, but never manages to get to it’ 
(ibid., p. 43; my translation), or to be fully determined by it. In exercises of aesthetic freedom 
one therefore ‘moves back and forth between the expectation that there is something to be 
comprehended and the indeterminacy of what is to be comprehended’ (ibid., p. 44; my 
translation).  
Comparing moral with aesthetic freedom along the lines of receptivity, 
disinterestedness and activity enables us to appreciate what is distinctive about exercises of 
aesthetic freedom. What is more, we can now see why aesthetic freedom as a distinct variant 
of individual freedom supplies us with the resources to address the scope problem of 
unfreedom that mars Honneth’s accout of democratic Sittlichkeit. Exercises of aesthetic 
freedom can turn existing roles and norms themselves into the subject matter of an 
unrestricted practice of freedom (for examples of this, see the two case studies below (II.3 
and II.4)). At the same time, such exercises of aesthetic freedom do not simply abstract (like 
exercises of pathological freedom) from given roles and norms, but are grounded in taking 
seriously how inhabiting these roles and living according to these norms appear to us. Like 
the other two variants of individual freedom, aesthetic freedom is a recognition relationship 
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that is associated with a social status that licenses individuals to engage in a distinct activity. 
All variants of individual freedom grant some form of freedom from the social within the 
social. Aesthetic freedom complements the distinct contributions that legal and moral 
freedom make and addresses the residual unfreedom associated with the limited scope of 
legal and moral freedom. In sum, integrating aesthetic freedom into our accounts of 
democratic Sittlichkeit enables us to make good on the promise of democratic ethical life to 
be a life of freedom.  
II. Democratic Sittlichkeit and the Problem of Conformism 
 
I can now proceed to the second problem of unfreedom: conformism. The issue of 
conformism is different from the problem of scope unfreedom. In the latter case, what is at 
issue is whether there is a variant of freedom that can turn given social roles and norms into 
the subject matter of a sufficiently unrestricted practice of freedom, whereas in the former 
case we are concerned with how we inhabit social roles. Unlike in the case of the scope 
unfreedom, Honneth acknowledges in one footnote that there might be a ‘tendency for 
conformism’ (Honneth, 2014, p. 384, n.476) in-built in role-mediated relationships. He even 
suggests that in the light of this tendency one ‘might be tempted to view “aesthetic freedom”’ 
as ‘an independent category of freedom’ (ibid.; Rebentisch, 2016) capable of countering this 
tendency. Unfortunately, Honneth does not attempt to answer the questions this aside raises 
(in Freedom’s Right or anywhere else): What exactly is conformism? How does it undermine 
our freedom (and thus democratic ethical life’s aspiration to be a life of freedom)? What 
features of role-mediated relationships give rise to this ‘tendency for conformism’ (Honneth, 
2014, p. 384, p. 476)? Does aesthetic freedom constitute a distinct variant of freedom? And 
why should we consider aesthetic freedom a counterforce to conformism? In this second step 
of my argument I outline answers to all of these questions.
16
 
 
II.1 Conforming vs. Conformism 
In order to make sense of this tendency for conformism, we need to first clarify what is meant 
by ‘social role’. Honneth embraces not only Talcott Parsons’ structural functionalism (e.g. 
Parsons, 1951; Honneth, 2014, pp. 3-4) but also his structural role theory. As a consequence, 
he understands ‘social roles’ as bundles of normative expectations and ‘behavioural 
demands’ (Honneth, 2014, p. 126; Callero, 2008, p. 275). However, as interactionists like 
Ralph H. Turner have pointed out, these expectations and demands typically only amount to 
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‘general patterns’ (Callero, 2008, p. 276) that ‘leave a great deal to individual discretion’ 
(Turner, 2002, p. 235). Creatively addressing this ‘degree of uncertainty and discretion’ 
(Callero, 2008, p. 276) is thus constitutive of playing roles. For example, while most parents 
understand that affection and discipline are key elements when it comes to raising a child, 
they are also aware that they need to generate their own interpretation of these underspecified 
notions in their day to day interaction with their child. 
 Having clarified the notion of social role and what is involved in conforming with 
roles, we can move on to the next question: How can we tell apart conformist conforming (in 
short, conformism) from non-conformist conforming with normative expectations associated 
with roles? Like Honneth, I am committed to the view that conforming with roles need not be 
conformist and thus freedom undermining.
17
 After all, talk of a ‘tendency for conformism’ 
(Honneth, 2014, p. 384, n.476) only makes sense if non-conformist conforming is possible. In 
short, we cannot infer from the fact that individuals are conforming with role expectations 
that they do so in a conformist fashion. The difference between conforming and conformism 
must therefore lie in how one is inhabiting one’s social roles and meeting behavioural 
expectations associated with them. I propose that individuals conform in a conformist 
fashion, if they are not guided by how playing roles appears to them, when addressing the 
question if they should continue playing a role, or how to creatively interpret the (always to 
some degree underspecified) behavioural expectations associated with it. The expression 
‘how playing a role appears’ to role incumbents might seem unclear and unfamiliar to the 
reader. It is meant to be more or less synonymous with ‘how one experiences playing a 
role’.
18
 By contrast, individuals conforming in non-conformist fashion remain attentive to 
how they experience playing their roles and draw on these experiences when creating, and 
reflecting on, possible alternative (interpretations of) roles.  
 A similar thought can already be found in Hegel, for he speaks of the ‘death of the 
individual’ in cases in which individuals merely follow ‘custom’ without habitually 
‘asserting’ (Hegel, 1991, § 151A, p. 195; translation amended) themselves. Furthermore, 
what I call conformism denotes a problem that exercises authors like Emerson, Mill and 
Cavell who are associated with a perfectionist strand in democratic theory. Like Hegel, these 
authors link conformism with unfreedom as it engenders a form of self-loss (Cavell, 1990, 
pp. 26-7; Mill, 1991, p. 78). For if one does not take how one experiences playing a role 
seriously in relation to whether, and how, one interprets and plays one’s roles, then one has 
no claim to be taking oneself seriously. By implication, if one is not taking oneself seriously, 
one cannot be said to realise oneself, or one’s freedom, in those role-mediated relationships. 
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Emerson thus stresses the importance of ‘self-reliance’ (Emerson, 1990, p. 131), Mill the 
relevance of cultivating ‘the person’s own character’ (Mill, 1991, p. 63) and Cavell the ‘idea 
of being true to oneself’ (Cavelll, 1990, p. 1). What is more, another elective affinity between 
these perfectionist authors and me consists in the fact that they also argue that conformism 
not only undermines individuals’ freedom, but threatens the ‘democratic aspiration’ (ibid.) of 
being a life of freedom. For this presupposes the full development of a democratic society’s 
capacity for self-critique and self-transformation.   
 Mill, for instance, characterises conformist individuals as conforming to and 
creatively interpreting the behavioural expectations associated with their roles without 
‘ask[ing] themselves--what do I prefer? or, what would suit my character and disposition?’ 
(Mill, 1991, p. 68; also p. 77). Mill stipulates that to some it might simply ‘not occur to … 
have any inclination, except for what is customary’ (ibid., p. 68). As a result, they ‘conform 
to custom, merely as custom’ (ibid., p. 65). Others are aware of their ‘feelings and character’ 
(ibid.) and recognise aspects of their individuality bringing them at odds with their roles (or 
certain interpretations of them). However, a conformist individual responds to such a tension 
by ‘rendering’ her or ‘his feelings and character inert and torpid’ (ibid.), as opposed to taking 
these negative experiences seriously, that is to say as a starting point for a critical and 
creative re-evaluation of her or his roles. What these and other guises of conformism have in 
common is that the individuals in questions play their roles without really ‘consulting’ 
themselves ‘on the state of’ their ‘consent’ (Cavell, 1990, p. 28; also pp. 2, 27; Mill, 1991, p. 
65) when creatively interpreting the underspecified expectations associated with their roles.
19
  
 There are a number of different strategies available to individuals to generate 
conformist interpretations of social roles. One option mentioned by Mill is to imitate others 
inhabiting the same role (Mill, 1991, p. 64; also p. 68). As a university lecturer, I can respond 
to the increasing pressure to get very high students satisfaction ratings by imitating my 
highest scoring colleagues. As a result, I might change my teaching style (e.g. how I interact 
with students, how I link what I teach with current events), the modes of assessments (e.g. I 
could replace essays or exams with group presentations), or the way in which I deliver 
feedback (e.g. I could replace written comments with video files). As a conformist, I would 
implement these changes without consulting myself, or taking seriously how it would be like 
for me to teach like this. Note that even imitating others requires a degree of creativity. 
Transposing what others do to one’s own situation involves making all kinds of 
determinations. My class sizes might be different from those of colleagues who come out on 
top in student evaluations. Furthermore, they might be teaching a different subject (or 
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specialisation of my subject), or students in different years, etc. Let us now consider a 
different conformist strategy. I could also reinvent myself as a teacher by inventing novel 
teaching styles, assessments and feedback procedures (instead of imitating successful 
colleagues). Assuming that I do all this in order to do well in student assessments and without 
taking seriously how teaching like this appears to me, I would still play my role in a 
conformist fashion. What this example brings out is the difference between being creative 
and exercising aesthetic freedom. The latter always entails the former, but the former does 
not suffice for the latter. For a creative interpretation of a role to qualify as an exercise of 
aesthetic freedom, it has to be guided by ‘one’s own experience’ (Cavell, 1990, p. 2), or one’s 
own ‘voice’ (ibid., p. 27).  
 Entailed in these remarks is already explanation as to why conforming need not be 
conformist. The decision to conforming with a (creative interpretation of a) social role can be 
expressive of individuals’ ‘consent’ if it is grounded in a process of them ‘consulting’ (ibid., 
p. 28) themselves. Sociologists speak in this regard of a ‘personal stage in which one 
develops an idiosyncratic version of the role that suits the individual’s unique disposition’ 
(Turner, 2002, p. 248). If this happens, individuals will not experience playing their roles as 
confining, or to the extent they do find it confining, they might be unable to imagine 
alternative roles, or interpretations of them, which they, all things considered, regard as less 
confining. For this reason, exercises of aesthetic freedom – that is, taking seriously how 
playing roles appears to oneself, letting these experiences guide oneself when generating, and 
reflecting on, possible alternatives to them – can result in the re-affirmation of given social 
roles, or certain interpretations of them. Exercises of aesthetic freedom are thus neither biased 
in favour nor against the status quo. They engender the potential for radical change, but can 
also underpin resistance to change. However, the decisive difference between conformism 
and reaffirmation can only emerge in the wake of exercises of aesthetic freedom (e.g. 
Rebentisch, 2010, p. 183; Rebentisch 2016, pp. 84-85).  
 
II.2 From Conforming to Conformism 
With the distinction between conforming and conformism clarified, we can now turn our 
attention to the question of why role-mediated relationships engender a ‘tendency for 
conformism’ (Honneth 2014: 384n476) which threatens to undermine our freedom. As might 
be expected, there are many ‘factors contributing’ to this tendency (Hogan, 2001, p. 1), that 
is, a ‘broad range’ of mechanisms, ‘forces, beliefs and desires’, some ‘blatant’, some ‘subtle’, 
some ‘mutually reinforcing with great cumulative effect’ (ibid.). Given this complexity, I 
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have to confine myself here to providing some backing for the claim that such a tendency 
exists and illustrating some of the factors underpinning it. In other words, I want to point to 
some forces that render individuals less disposed to take seriously how playing a role appears 
to them and to creatively explore, on this basis, alternatives to given roles (or interpretations 
of them).  
  At this stage in my argument, it makes sense to turn to findings in sociological role 
theory supporting the alleged in-built tendency for conformism or ‘accommodation’ (Turner 
1990: 90). One such finding states that once a role is established, there is a ‘tendency for the 
broad outline of roles and sometimes quite specific role elements’ (Turner, 2002, p. 235) ‘to 
persist in spite of changes in the actors who play the role’ (ibid., p. 241). Role theorists 
invoke a number of factors to explain this tendency: First, they postulate an interest in 
maintaining stability which, in turn, discourages engaging with established roles in ways that 
could potentially open them up to radical changes. For ‘changes in a focal role threatens the 
stability of relationships and force some changes in relevant alter roles’ (ibid., p. 235). 
Second, role theorists identify an interest in ‘predictability’ (ibid.). Since predictability is 
regarded as ‘essential for social relationships’ (ibid.), this interest serves again as an obstacle 
to opening up roles to practices of freedom that could bring about ‘radical changes’ (ibid.) 
and thus ‘provoke anxiety’ (ibid.). Typically, not even the individuals in favour of role 
change are initially aware of where the process of drafting an ‘unattained but attainable self’ 
(Emerson, 1990, p. 115) on the basis of diffuse and underspecified negative experiences will 
lead them. Third, role theorists tell us that it is normal for an individual to form an 
‘attachment’ to the ‘particular roles’ (Turner, 2002, p. 242) she or he plays, in fact, the 
‘individual tends to merge self with given roles’ (ibid., p. 248). Again, this tendency fuels a 
disposition to disregard negative experiences with a role (or a given interpretation of it). Role 
theorists have identified a number of forces that account for the propensity to form 
attachments to roles or merge with them. For a start, there is ‘a tendency … to view ourselves 
as others’ (ibid.) see us. Instead of paying attention to how playing a role appears to us and 
what we can infer from this for who we take ourselves to be, we tend to focus on, and 
identify ourselves with, how others view us as role incumbents. In addition, we tend to 
‘identify ourselves most strongly with roles in which we experience … favourable 
evaluations’ (ibid.). And the stronger one identifies with a role, the more one will be inclined 
to disregard one’s negative experience with (aspects of) that role. This observation is linked 
with a worry expressed by recognition theorists. They highlight that our desire for 
recognition, or being (highly) esteemed, entails a tendency for alienation and unfreedom 
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(Neuhouser, 2008, pp. 57-89; Rousseau, 1997, pp. 111-231). On the one hand, we tend to 
prefer roles that confer a higher social status over those with a lower associated status. On the 
other hand, the craving for favourable evaluations fuels an inclination to perform roles (e.g. 
as a teacher) in such a way that one expects to solicit the most positive responses from others. 
Our sense of alienation can therefore be rooted in the fact that we do not let ourselves be 
guided by how we experience playing roles. Finally, we tend to most strongly identify ‘with 
those roles in which we have made the greatest investment’ (Turner, 2002, p. 248). Again, 
the stronger our degree of identification with a role, the more inclined we become to 
disregard experience with our roles that bring us at odds with them. It is important to 
appreciate that all of the above factors that account for a tendency for conformism pertain to 
role-mediated relationship in general. By implication they also apply to relationships of social 
freedom. Moreover, all of these factors even affect individuals who experience playing their 
roles, or given interpretations of them, as limiting.  
 It is important to appreciate further that these general factors can be amplified by 
historically and contextually specific mechanisms. For instance, specific formal and informal 
negative or positive sanctions can have an impact on whether individuals feel encouraged to 
contemplate how they experience inhabiting their roles and to playfully explore alternatives 
to (given interpretations of) roles. For example, in a context in which engaging in non-
heterosexual intimate relationships entails the possibility of criminal charges and/or social 
ostracizing, individuals with non-heterosexual inclinations have a motive to render 
themselves unresponsive to them. However, there are also more subtle ways of interfering 
with the process of relying on one’s ‘own experience’ (Cavell, 1990, p. 2). Consider, for 
instance, a phenomenon Honneth (2004) calls ‘Organized Self-Realization’. Since the 1970s, 
it has become more and more common to expect, or socially demand, that individuals 
applying for and doing jobs display certain emotional attitudes (e.g. enthusiasm) and present 
their professional life as essential to their self-realisation. In this way, the ideal of self-
realisation is turned into its opposite. It is supposed to licence individuals to take seriously 
how inhabiting a role appears to them and, on this basis, to creatively and critically reflect on 
their roles. However, in its co-opted form, the demand for self-realisation confronts 
individuals with a social expectation pertaining to how they ought to feel about their job. 
Individuals are thus faced with a situation in which they are encouraged to engage their 
emotional life as part of their professional role, while, at the same time, the emotional states 
they ought to display are scripted for them. In this manner, it is implicitly communicated to 
individuals that contemplating and expressing how they actually experience performing their 
EJP-17-298.R1 
 
 23
role is not appropriate (especially if their experiences are at odds with the emotions they are 
expected to display). Furthermore, individuals are led to believe that a ‘misfit between role 
and person’ (Turner, 1990, p. 99), that is between how their role appears to them and how 
they ought to feel about their job, amounts to a personal failure. As a consequence, they will 
habitually cover up what they experience as a personal failure by faking certain emotional 
states. This, in turn, encourages the development of a disposition to disassociate oneself from 
how playing one’s role really appears to oneself. At the same time, one feels forced to turn 
one’s emotional experiences into a resource. For one has to tap into experiences made in 
other areas of one’s life (e.g. experiences of enthusiasm), in order to fulfil expectations 
associated with one’s professional role (i.e. to display one’s enthusiasm about one’s 
professional role). All of this can give rise to ‘symptoms’ like an acute sense of alienation, 
‘inner emptiness, … and of absence of purpose’ (Honneth, 2004, p. 463). What is more, 
organised self-realisation crowds out genuine exercises of aesthetic freedom (under the 
pretence of inviting them). In sum, a whole range of general features of role-mediated 
relationships as well as historically and contextually specific mechanisms (such as the 
demand for self-realisation) fuel a tendency for roles to ‘become ossified’ (Turner, 2002, p. 
252). We therefore have, pace Honneth, no reason to think that relationships of social 
freedom ‘are safe from the danger of’ conformism, or of ‘becoming passively petrified’ 
(Honneth, 2014, p. 66).  
 Against the backdrop of this account of conformism and (some of) the factors fuelling 
it, we can also appreciate why aesthetic freedom is a counterforce to conformism and the 
unfreedom it brings in its wake. Being (genuinely) recognised as an aesthetic subject means 
that individuals are culturally granted the opportunity to engage in a distinct and multi-
dimensional activity. Exercises of aesthetic freedom encourage us to pay heightened attention 
to how the world (e.g. our social roles) appear to us. What is more, exercises of aesthetic are 
not only unrestricted in their passive-receptive dimension they are also disinterested, which 
turns them into a counterforce to the ‘tendency’ to keep in place the ‘broad outline of roles 
and sometimes quite specific role elements’ (Turner, 2002, p. 235). The previous two 
dimensions are complemented by an unrestricted active-creative dimension which means that 
exercises of aesthetic freedom, guided by experiences of negativity with extant roles, 
generate alternatives to given (interpretations of) roles (Turner, 1990, p. 90). Aesthetic 
freedom as a socially valid variant of individual freedom thus accustoms us to remain, or 
become time and again, unaccustomed to given roles and norms (Seel, 2014, p. 278; also p. 
276; Menke, 2013, pp. 153-155), hereby bringing about a historic ‘dynamisation’ 
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(Rebentisch, 2010, p. 185; my translation) of role-mediated relationships.
20
 Aesthetic 
freedom thus sustains a distinct register of democratic self-critique and self-transformation, 
whereby the ‘possibility or necessity of transforming of oneself’ is seen as connected to the 
‘possibility and necessity of transforming … of one’s society’ (Cavell, 1990, p. 2; also pp. 
27-28). For the individuals who experience their roles as limiting and ‘redraw’ (ibid., p. 4) 
them in attentive-creative exercises of aesthetic freedom also need to imagine ‘a 
transformation of society’ (ibid., p. 7). That is, they have to imagine a transformed society in 
which they could realise themselves as their ‘next self’ (ibid., p. 9). Fully realising 
‘democracy’s capacity for criticism from within’ (Conant, 2000, p. 227; also Cavell, 1990, p. 
3) therefore presupposes that aesthetic freedom forms part and parcel of the fabric of 
democratic life. This entails appreciating the representative potential of exercises of aesthetic 
freedom. In democratic life ‘anyone is entitled’ (Cavell, 1990, p. 10) to rely on and 
communicate how their social world appears to them. And as fellow citizens we have to 
remain open to the possibility that others’ exercises of aesthetic freedom uncover experiences 
that are ‘representative of certain facts or conditions’ (ibid., p. 24; also Mill, 1991, pp. 71-75) 
that undermine our freedom. Democratic Sittlichkeit as a life of freedom thus requires, among 
other things, that we, as Cavell points out ‘manifest for the other the other way’ (Cavell, 
1990, p. 31) by paying attention to negative experiences with social roles and playfully 
generating, guided by these experiences, objects of comparison and contrast to them. For 
instance, Cavell understands the character Nora in Ibsen’s play as someone who manifests 
problems that are, at the same time, deeply personal and representative, as these problems are 
inextricably linked with the limiting nature of roles available to most women (and men) at the 
time (ibid., pp. 109-112).  
 
II.3 Case Study 1: The Aesthetic Dimension of the Socialist Critique of the Capitalist Market 
Against the backdrop of the above discussion, I now want to move on two case studies that 
show aesthetic freedom in action as a counterforce to conformism and as a force that expands 
the transformative scope of freedom beyond what is enabled by exercises of moral freedom. 
First, I would like to come back to Honneth’s depiction of the socialist critique of the 
capitalist market in order to shed light on its the aesthetic dimensions. In particular, I would 
like to invoke aesthetic freedom’s three core features and relate them to this instance of 
radical critique.
21
  
First of all, the socialist critique presupposes the unrestricted receptivity characteristic 
of exercises of aesthetic freedom. For the socialists let themselves be impressed by all kinds 
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of aspects of post-revolutionary social reality: how workers experienced their relationship to 
themselves, their peers and their employers, how the kind of work they had to do affected 
them, how they experienced their relationship to the products of their work, etc. In other 
words, the socialists’ attentiveness was not limited to what workers needed to pay attention to 
in order to fulfil their role obligations, given the extant definition of their social role. 
Secondly, the socialists’ engagement with their social world was also disinterested. They 
suspended their commitment to extant social roles and norms in their exploration of how their 
social world appeared to them. As a result, the socialists attended to many negative 
experiences related to the capitalist economy, even though they could not account for the 
negativity or badness of these experiences in terms of the norm of legal freedom 
underpinning the capitalist market. Since their engagement with their social world was 
disinterested, they were not bothered by the fact that many of the experiences that showed up 
to them as negative were rooted in the very norm that was mediating relationships in the 
capitalist market sphere, namely, the ‘largely legal notion of individual freedom’ (Honneth, 
2016, p. 11). Only because the socialists suspended their commitment to this norm 
underlying the economic sphere, could this norm itself appear to them as part, or source, of 
the problem. Finally, the socialists’ active-creative engagement with their social world was 
grounded in this unrestricted and disinterested receptivity. They not only contemplated but 
playfully explored how the elements that made up their extant social world, as well as the 
relationships between them, could be re-conceived or rearranged. From this aesthetic 
engagement with post-revolutionary social conditions emerged many poetic inventions, that 
is, new ways of seeing and speaking about this social world. Notions like alienated labour 
(ibid., pp. 89, 99, 107), reification, exploitation or commodity fetishism, to name but a few, 
were generated in exercises of aesthetic freedom that attentively and creatively played along 
how life in the capitalist market appeared to those involved in it. Notions like socialism, 
social freedom, phalanstères, proletariat, or the idea of an ‘association of free producers’ 
(ibid., p. 20) are for this reason (also) products of exercises of aesthetic freedom. They are 
innovative alternative models or interpretations of how individuals and their activities in the 
productive-cooperative sphere could be unified (in a less oppressive way). 
II. 4 Case Study 2: The Aesthetic Dimension of Feminist Consciousness Raising Groups 
Consciousness raising or ‘CR groups’ played an important role in the women’s movement of 
the 1960s and 70s. They also provide a powerful illustration of aesthetic freedom’s non-
conformist tendency and transformative potential. CR groups, which often were co-extensive 
with or later ‘became writing groups’ (Reed, 2005, p. 99), were arguably the ‘major 
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technique of analysis, structure of organization, method of practice, and theory of social 
change of the women’s movement’ (MacKinnon, 1982, p. 5) in this period. My claim is that 
the best way to make sense of CR and writing groups is to regard them as a collective 
exercise of aesthetic freedom, since they instantiate all three features of relating aesthetically 
to the world (e.g. Reed, 2005, p. 89). 
First of all, the receptivity at work in ‘consciousness-raising … groups’ (Reed, 2005, p. 
76: Ware, 1970, pp. 108-119) was both unrestricted and disinterested. Their point was ‘the 
close examination of the individual lives of group members’ (Ware, 1970, p. 100) and their 
‘personal experiences’ (ibid., p. 112; MacKinnon, 1982, p. 23). Literally, every aspect of 
women’s lives, or how it appeared to them, became the object of aesthetic contemplation. 
This process of ‘opening up’ and ‘sharing’ (Reed, 2005, p. 89) was disinterested as the 
women engaging in it intentionally suspended the established male-dominated framework of 
perception, interpretation and evaluation.
22
 The ‘method’ of CR meetings was designed to 
enable women to get to know their lives and social world ‘in a different way’, that is, ‘within 
yet outside the male paradigm’ (MacKinnon, 1982, p. 22). CR was the ‘collective speaking of 
women’s experience, from the perspective of that experience’ (ibid., p. 6). Realising this aim 
required women to be poetic, since they had to find their own words to describe and share 
their experiences.
23
 ‘Poetry was’ therefore regarded as essential to ‘consciousness-raising’ 
and understood as a ‘feminist practice’ (Reed, 2005, p. 92) that underpinned a ‘process’ that 
was ‘transformative as well as perceptive’ (MacKinnon, 1982, p. 29).
24
 We can make sense 
of this transformative dimension along the lines of the unrestrictedly-creative, meaning-
generating activity that forms part of exercises of aesthetic freedom. Subsequent to sharing 
their personal experiences, the participants in CR groups collectively interpreted and 
analysed them. Together they explored connections between various experiences, their roots 
and how the elements that make up women’s lives could be reconceived in order for these 
lives to form a different, less oppressive unity (Ware, 1970, p. 44). Characterising the 
activities of the SCUM (Society to Cut Up Men) CR group, Ware states that the members 
perform ‘a poetic leap of the imagination forcing new insights into the roles women and men 
play’ (ibid., p. 113) and could play.  
In short, the ‘feminist method’ of ‘consciousness raising’ (MacKinnon, 1982, p. 29) is 
best understood as a collective exercise of ‘interpreting attentiveness’ (Seel, 2014, p. 275) 
that is underpinned by an unrestricted, disinterested receptivity: a willingness to let 
something happen to oneself in the process of opening up to one’s own world and accounts of 
others’ experiences. One cannot adequately make sense of this ‘collective critical 
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reconstitution of the meaning of women’s social experience’ (MacKinnon, 1982, p. 29) that 
takes place in CR groups, without invoking the notion of aesthetic freedom. In these 
exercises of aesthetic freedom, participants of CR groups re-experienced their social world as 
one that is indeterminate or still to be determined by them through playful aesthetic 
exploration and collective action. This is what links ‘the close examination of the individual 
lives of group members’ with the ambition ‘to determine how society must be changed to 
eliminate the oppression to which all women can testify’ (Ware, 1970, p. 100). What is more, 
the fact that women, like the socialists, took recourse to a collective practice of aesthetic 
freedom tells us something about this variant of freedom, namely, that is was culturally 
available to them, which, in turn, suggests that it formed part of the relations of freedom 
making up democratic ethical life. This brings me to the third and final step in my argument.  
 
III. The Social Validity and Historic Effectiveness of Aesthetic Freedom 
 
Accounts of democratic ethical life aim to reconstruct all dimensions of the value of freedom 
that have ‘taken on an institutional shape’ (Honneth, 2014: p. 66). For only a comprehensive 
account of democratic Sittlichkeit provides an adequate description of the ‘complicated web 
of’ (ibid., p. 330) relations of freedom that makes up democratic life. I have already 
supported the claim that aesthetic freedom denotes, conceptually speaking, a distinct variant 
of freedom, or way of relating to the world. However, in order to underpin my case that 
Honneth’s account of democratic Sittlichkeit is incomplete, I also need to show that aesthetic 
freedom is ‘socially valid’ (ibid., p. 63).
 25
 In addition to my remarks on the socialist critique 
of the market and the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970s, I therefore provide further 
historical and sociological evidence that suggests that aesthetic freedom has been, from the 
very beginning, a socially valid and historically effective force in modern democratic life.
26
 
III.1 Case Study 3: Artist Critique and Its Co-optation 
The idea of the aesthetic – like the notion of moral freedom as autonomy – emerged just 
before the modern democratic revolution in the 18
th
 Century and thus belongs to its 
intellectual and praxeological context.
27
 The ‘aesthetic revolution’ (Rancière, 2002) is not 
just an event in intellectual history, it has a practical dimension since it is linked with ‘certain 
“aesthetic” behaviors’ (Shiner, 2001, p. 132) that are different ‘from moral and utilitarian … 
behavior’ (ibid., p. 133). Members of modern societies aspired to familiarise themselves with 
this distinct type of aesthetic behaviour.
28
 As a consequence, the history of the aesthetic has 
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also become a subject matter for sociologists. If one studies the social validity of aesthetic 
freedom in modern democratic life over the last two hundred years from a sociological 
perspective, one can learn not only that the aesthetic discourse ‘enjoys broad social 
consensus’ (Chiapello, 2004, p. 585; also p. 588; Chiapello, 1998) but also that it has 
underpinned a distinct variant of social critique. Chiapello refers to this variant of critique as 
‘“Artist critique”’, even though artists ‘were not the only ones’ (Chiapello, 2004, p. 585) 
engaging in it. “Artist critique” is used here as ‘an umbrella term, synthesising … many 
forms of critique first levelled against the new industrial, capitalist, and bourgeois society of 
the nineteenth century’ (ibid.). It is grounded in exercises of freedom that are neither 
reducible to moral nor legal freedom, despite the fact that “Artist critique” is also made ‘in 
the name of freedom’ (ibid.). But unlike in the case of moral and legal freedom, artist critique 
is ‘free’ in the sense of being ‘emancipated from all forms of [social, J.S.] constraint … and 
convention’ (ibid., p. 588; my emphasis).  
 Sociological studies like Chiapello’s thus confirm that exercises of aesthetic freedom 
have been recognised as forming part of modern democratic life since its inception. 
Furthermore, she establishes a link between aesthetic freedom and a distinct relation of 
recognition, for the ‘formulation of [the artist] critique presupposes the existence of a speaker 
whose status is such that other people feel they have to listen to what she/he has to say’ 
(ibid., pp. 587-588). What we can learn from Chiapello is that (at least some) members of 
democratic societies have always assumed to have, or claimed for themselves, a social status 
that licensed them to relate aesthetically to aspects of their social world, and to do so in a 
publicly visible fashion.  
 Theorists of democratic Sittlichkeit therefore have reasons to revisit the history of 
modern democratic life in order to get a better sense of the social struggles surrounding 
aesthetic freedom and their contributions to democratic ethical life. The history of political 
freedom, for example, is often told as a struggle for inclusion (qua overcoming of exclusions 
based on property or sex, etc.). There are clues that similar struggles for progressive inclusion 
have taken place with regards to aesthetic freedom. For relating aesthetically to one’s social 
world was up to the late 19
th
 Century regarded as the privilege of ‘artists and writers’, that is, 
individuals who occupied a distinct ‘position in the field of cultural production’ (ibid., p. 
589). However, their aesthetic practices were then ‘copied by other types of actors’ such as 
‘intellectuals, journalists, and many other media professional’, before ‘anyone … demanded 
for him- or herself’ the licence to engage in artist critique in the wake of the ‘1968 … student 
protest’ (ibid.). What is needed, in other words, is a critical review of the history of exercises 
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of aesthetic freedom in modern democratic life to learn more about the struggles for its 
progressive ‘democratisation’ (ibid., p. 585).  
Of course, we also need to take seriously sociological studies, focussing in particular 
on the economic sphere, that argue that the artist ‘critique of capitalism’ has lost ‘much of its 
poignancy’ in the past two or three decades, due to it having ‘been mimicked’ by ‘neo-
management’ practices (ibid.; also pp. 589-593; Boltanski/Chiapello, 2007, pp. 419-472; 
Honneth, 2004). In response to such findings, I would like to stress firstly that they 
strengthen my case, since what led to these attempts at co-opting aesthetic freedom was 
arguably its ‘success’ and progressive ‘democratisation’ (Chiapello, 2004, p. 585) – 
otherwise co-opting it would have been pointless. Secondly, my claim that aesthetic freedom 
is a socially valid part of democratic ethical life is compatible with acknowledging that 
aesthetic freedom can be misused, or turned against itself, or take on pathological forms (that 
undermine rather than contribute to our freedom). Shedding light on such social 
misdevelopments is something that critical theorists have always considered to be one of their 
main tasks (e.g. Freyenhagen, 2015; Honneth, 2009; Zurn, 2011). Honneth, for instance, 
explores how the idea of self-realisation that was linked with non-conformist, ‘experimental 
processes’ was turned into a social demand ‘issuing from without’ (Honneth, 2004, p. 474) 
that undermines freedom. 
III.2 Case Study 4: The Increasing Openness of Social Roles  
Another social development that supports aesthetic freedom’s social validity and historical 
effectiveness is the fact that social roles have been progressively opened ‘to interpretation’ 
and thus are expected to ‘leave’ more and more ‘room for social negotiation’ (Honneth, 2014, 
p. 126). This social tendency cannot be understood as being driven by moral and legal 
freedom. Furthermore, these variants of individual freedom do not provide us with the 
normative resources to underpin the familiar evaluation of this development as brining in its 
wake an increase in terms of freedom. The fact that we ‘offer’ increasing ‘opportunities for 
intersubjective interpretation’ (ibid., pp. 126-127) of social roles is best understood as the 
result of successful struggles for democratising aesthetic freedom, that is, a form of freedom 
that turns social roles and norms into the subject matter of a practice of freedom. This is a 
development that brings in its wake ‘increasing individualization, … social deviation and 
rearrangement’ while decreasing ‘the rigidity of these roles’ (ibid.). Despite being aware of 
the phenomenon, Honneth fails to appreciate that it is a legacy of aesthetic freedom that we 
grant each other more and more opportunities to negotiate social roles and to generate 
‘individual interpretations’ of them, interpretations that would have been ‘unthinkable’ (ibid., 
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p. 127) a couple of decades earlier. As part of democratic ethical life, aesthetic freedom 
opens up social roles generally. Moral freedom also opens up social roles, but in a much 
more limited sense. For it only supports transformations of social roles that render them less 
biased. Whereas aesthetic freedom is a force that counters the tendency for roles to ‘become 
ossified’ (Turner, 2002, p. 252). The increasing openness for role change illustrates yet again 
the social validity and historic effectiveness of (struggles for) aesthetic freedom. 
Furthermore, we can learn from this case study that integrating aesthetic freedom into our 
accounts of democratic ethical life not only renders them more complete, it also has 
explanatory benefits, for aesthetic freedom can drive social developments and account for 
why certain social changes are seen as generating benefits in terms of freedom.  
Conclusion  
In this paper, I presented an argument to the effect that aesthetic freedom denotes a variant of 
individual freedom that forms part and parcel of democratic ethical life and provides us with 
the resources to deal with three shortcomings of Honneth’s account of democratic Sittlichkeit, 
which copies the architecture of relations of freedom from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.  
 In a first step, I showed that integrating aesthetic freedom into our accounts of 
democratic Sittlichkeit enables us to address the problem of scope unfreedom. For democratic 
ethical life fails to live up to be a life of freedom if it relies only on legal and moral freedom 
as variants of individual freedom, for these two variants of individual freedom are, on their 
own, unable to turn roles and norms themselves into the subject matter of sufficiently 
unrestricted practices of freedom. In a second step, I explained why role-mediated relations 
such as relationships of social freedom entail a ‘tendency for conformism’ (Honneth, 2014, p. 
384, n.476) threatening to undermine our freedom and demonstrated that aesthetic freedom 
can serve as a counterforce to conformism. Finally, I argued that accounts of democratic 
Sittlichkeit omitting aesthetic freedom remain incomplete, since aesthetic freedom denotes a 
distinct and socially valid variant of individual freedom.  
 What emerges from this line of argument is a novel Hegelian view of the relationship 
between aesthetics and democratic politics. This position is unique since it first, 
conceptualises the aesthetic as a separate variant of individual freedom that is linked with a 
distinct relationship of recognition. Second, this approach to aesthetics and democratic 
politics takes into account the fact of social functional differentiation, for aesthetic freedom is 
understood as forming part of a ‘complicated web of’ (ibid., p. 330) different relations of 
individual and social freedom. Against this backdrop, it becomes possible to identify the 
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location, or distinct relation of freedom, into which exercises of aesthetic freedom intervene. 
Finally, it is another virtue of this approach that it provides a straightforward answer to the 
questions of why aesthetic freedom has a legitimate place in democratic ethical life at all. For 
it argues that in order for democratic Sittlichkeit to live up to its aspiration to be a life of 
freedom, relations of social freedom have to be complemented not only by moral and legal 
freedom, but also another variant of individual freedom: aesthetic freedom.
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1
 See for instance, the collection edited by Kompridis (2014) entitled The Aesthetic Turn in 
Political Thought.  
2
 The most sophisticated recent contribution to this tradition is Gabriel Rockhill’s (2014). 
Inspired by Foucault, he argues for a historicist analysis of the relation between art and 
politics.  
3
 In Freedom’s Right, Honneth simply copies the architecture of relations of freedom that 
Hegel outlined in his Philosophy of Right: relations of social freedom (i.e. personal, 
economic and political relationships) are complemented by relations of individual freedom 
(i.e. moral and legal freedom). However, he fails to address the question of whether this 
architecture is suited for generating a distinctly democratic account of Sittlichkeit. 
4
 For accounts of such inadequate realisations – i.e. what Honneth variously calls ‘social 
pathologies’ and ‘misdevelopments’ – see, e.g. Freyenhagen (2015), Schaub (2015) and Zurn 
(2011). 
5
 This difference in scope is not the result of embracing a normative-reconstructive method, 
but the effect of understanding a social order in terms of Sittlichkeit. Habermas, for example, 
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endorses a normative-reconstructive method without adopting the Sittlichkeit outlook. As a 
result, he sees no problem in limiting the scope of his study of the ‘the modern constitutional 
state’ to the political and legal sphere (Habermas, 1996, pp. 64ff; Honneth, 2014, p. 345, n.1).  
6
 Honneth’s terminology has the disadvantage of making it appear as if individual freedom 
was not social (despite it being linked with relations of recognition).  
7
 Honneth defends a particularly demanding understanding of what it means to “act for one 
another”. For him, social freedom requires not just ‘mediating institutions that inform 
subjects in advance about the interdependence of their aims’ (Honneth, 2014, p. 65), but they 
have to act with the intention of fulfilling the others’ aims. When it comes to the economic 
sphere, this means that participants are ‘intentionally producing for each other on the basis of 
their mutual recognition of each other’s needs, thus performing their own actions for the sake 
of those needs’ (Honneth, 2016, p. 20; also p. 19; Brudney, 2014, p. 454; and Jütten, 2015). 
8
 For instance, my right to quit my job makes it possible for me to take up another 
occupation, but this opportunity does not guarantee that I will actually be able to find a more 
rewarding form of employment.  
9
 Of course, for this right to be more than formal, it is important to have recourse to social 
rights guaranteeing an adequate degree of social welfare and income. Following T.H. 
Marshall (1950), Honneth (2014, pp. 78-79, 258-259) distinguishes different types, or 
generations, of rights (i.e. civil, political, and social rights), highlighting their distinct roles in 
bringing about the social pre-conditions for individual self-realization. 
10
 See Honneth’s criticism of Forst’s constructivism which re-enacts the empty formalism 
objection that Hegel levelled against Kant (Honneth, 2014, p. 111; also Freyenhagen, 2012). 
For Honneth, the abstract criterion of ‘mutual justifiability . . .  is of little use’ and ‘remains 
entirely empty’, since it is impossible to judge whether forms of concrete behaviour are 
‘“justified” … [w]ithout taking account of … normative conditions’ like extant social roles, 
‘which represent the object of normative reconstruction’ (Honneth, 2014, p. 338, n.6; also pp. 
64-66; Forst, 2011).  
11
 When moral freedom impartially adjudicates conflicts between established roles and 
norms, it does so by way of re-interpreting them. Moral freedom does not treat such conflicts 
as an occasion to replace the conflicting elements with something else, or transform them in 
ways that go beyond rendering them les biased. Doing this would amount to no longer 
treating extant roles and norms as social facts. Responses to conflicts between roles and 
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norms that are radically transformative therefore fall outside the scope of moral freedom. See 
my discussion of the socialists’ critique of the capitalist market below.  
12
 For another argument to the effect that an internally coherent social whole can be deficient, 
see Freyenhagen (2013).   
13
 Honneth’s evaluation of the socialist legacy is not entirely positive. He regards the 
exclusive focus on the economic sphere as a deficit ‘in the original socialist program’ 
(Honneth, 2016, pp. 25-26). Furthermore, he identifies the burdening of the ‘socialist project 
… with a metaphysical theory of history’ (Honneth, 2016, p. 26) as a drawback. This last 
assessment is curious, since it does not match up with Honneth’s above-mentioned defence of 
a variant of an “end of history” thesis.   
14
 Curiously, the story Honneth tells about the economic sphere in The Idea of Socialism is 
incompatible with the account provided in Freedom’s Right. In the latter book, he argues that 
the notion of social freedom has been underlying the market sphere from the very beginning 
(Honneth, 2014, pp. 176-252), whereas in The Idea of Socialism, he claims that the notion of 
social freedom – understood as a form of cooperation in which ‘each person is concerned 
about the self-realization of the others for non-instrumental reasons’ (Honneth, 2016, p. 24) – 
is a conceptual innovation and creative response to negative experiences with the capitalist 
market and its underlying norm of legal freedom. This is, however, not the place to address 
the question of which of the two positions is more plausible.  
15
 My claim is not that moral or aesthetic interventions are always welcomed or tolerated, but 
that democratic Sittlichkeit supplies subjects with the justificatory resources to explain why 
depriving them of the opportunity to relate morally or aesthetically to aspects of their social 
world amounts to an unacceptable restriction of their subjective freedom. Like other variants 
of individual freedom, aesthetic freedom denotes freedom in the modality of possibility. We 
can therefore not infer from the fact that playful transformations of social roles and norms 
take place that the emerging alternatives will eventually become socially valid (or that it 
would always be a good thing if it did). 
16
 In the previous section, I answered the question of whether ‘“aesthetic freedom” … 
represents an independent category of freedom’ (Honneth, 2014, p. 384, n.476) in the 
affirmative. Unlike Honneth who refers to the ‘significance of art for the revitalization of the 
public’, I propose an understanding that makes it clear that aesthetic freedom is not confined 
to ‘art’ or artistic production. In contrast to Honneth, I highlight that interventions of 
aesthetic freedom are important to counter the tendency for conformism in all role-mediated 
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relationships, whereas Honneth only mentions that aesthetic freedom might be capable of 
revitalising political relations, or the ‘the sphere of the democratic public’ (ibid.).  
17
 We are, therefore, not facing the following aporia: we can only realise our freedom 
through role-mediated relationships, however, conforming with roles always undermines our 
freedom. 
18
 This usage of ‘appearing’ is inspired by Martin Seel’s (2005) monograph Aesthetics of 
Appearing in which appearing is presented as the beginning of aesthetics.  
19
 I argue that conformist individuals have a disposition not to take themselves seriously, but 
I say nothing here about why they develop such a disposition and whether we can hold them 
responsible for doing so. Addressing this issue would require, among other things, to look 
into the distinct forms of subjectivization to which they were exposed, the shape of the social 
practices into which they are socialised.  
20
 The claims of subjective freedom can only be adequately protected if there is an 
institutionalised variant of individual freedom that, like aesthetic freedom, forestalls that an 
individual ‘capitulates before its everyday understandings and roles, without any’, or 
sufficient, ‘resistance or detachment’ (Seel, 2014, p. 279). However, like other variants of 
individual freedom (i.e. moral and legal freedom), aesthetic freedom presupposes substantive 
contexts of action in which it can then intervene (Honneth, 2014, p. 123). For this reason, 
exercises of aesthetic freedom can never be ‘purely aesthetic’, for ‘aesthetic freedom only 
exists in a contradictory unity with practical freedom’ (Menke, 2013, p. 156; my translation), 
as it temporarily suspends and plays with given social roles and norms. 
21
 Recall, this critique was radical, as it involved the generation of an ‘original, 
groundbreaking idea’ (Honneth, 2016, p. 25), namely the idea of social freedom in the 
economic sphere. It was also radical since its goal was to replace the legal notion of 
individual freedom underlying the capitalist market with the idea of social freedom.  
22
 It is absolutely fascinating to see the explosion ‘of feminist issues that emerged from 
formal CR groups’ (Reed, 2005, p. 92; also MacKinnon, 1982, p. 15; Ware, 1970, p. 31). 
Many of them later became ‘issues for the agenda of women’s liberation’, such as ‘domestic 
violence’, the longing for ‘equal sexual pleasure for women’ or the ‘sense of social “double 
jeopardy” of being a woman and of color’ (Reed, 2005, p. 89). See in this respect also the 
poetry dealing with every aspect of women’s lives that burst out of CR and writing groups in 
this period (see, e.g., Morgan, 1970; Cade, 1970; Howe/Bass, 1973).  
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23
 See, for example, accounts of the collective poetic work that went into coining now 
common concepts like “sexual harassment” (Fricker, 2007, p. 150; also Brownmiller, 1990, 
p. 280-281).  
24
 Statements of participants like the following are therefore telling: ‘We do not rush to 
speech. We allow ourselves to be moved.’ (Susan Griffin quoted after MacKinnon, 1982, p. 
22; Ware, 1970, p. 44). 
25
 One way to think about this third step is as an answer to a possible objection that could be 
raised in response to the first two steps of my argument. The objection I have in mind is the 
following: A reader might agree that we need something else than legal and moral freedom to 
deal with scope unfreedom and conformism. Furthermore, she or he could acknowledge that 
aesthetic freedom is prima facie suitable for completing the account of democratic 
Sittlichkeit, yet she or he might still insist that in order for this not to be just abstract 
theorising, aesthetic freedom has to be socially valid, but it is not. In order to address this 
possible objection, I need to demonstrate that the final claim is mistaken, i.e. that aesthetic 
freedom is socially valid in having at least weak institutional shape. 
26
 Readers might wonder why I am not also considering ethical freedom as another variant of 
individual freedom potentially missing from the outlined picture of democratic Sittlichkeit. 
The reason for this is implicit in the Hegelian outlook which does not regard the ethical as a 
distinct variant of freedom. For freedom, or self-realisation, as the overarching value of 
democratic ethical life is itself regarded as being ethical in character. The good life is equated 
with the free life, and (ethical) freedom is realised through participation in a web of relations 
of recognition or freedom. Of course, it is possible to argue against and reject this picture, but 
to defend it is not the task I set myself in this paper.   
27
 See for a genealogy of the idea of moral autonomy, e.g., Schneewind (1998, esp. chs. 22-
23), and for the notion of the “aesthetic”, e.g., Shiner (2001, esp. ch. 7).  
28
 See, for instance, the popular guidebooks from the late eighteenth century (Link, 1992). 
29
 I would like to thank a reviewer for this journal for providing insightful comments on a 
previous version of this paper. The comments made me appreciate that I need to clearly 
distinguish between what I now call scope unfreedom and conformism. The reviewer also 
encouraged me to develop what I mean by conformism and explain why a tendency for 
conformism is in-built in relations mediated by social roles. She or he also pointed out to me 
the elective affinity between my worry about conformism and the Romantic and post-
Romantic critique of conformity developed by authors like Emmerson, Mill and Cavell. 
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Finally, I would like to acknowledge that the reviewer suggested to me the above used 
example of parents needing to generate interpretations of affection and discipline. 
 
 
